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Summary
On 14 January 2011 the overthrow of President Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali left 
Tunisia confronted with the task of addressing the dual legacy of Ben Ali’s vi-
olent crackdown on protesters in the weeks preceding his ouster and decades 
of widespread human rights abuses. In the immediate aftermath of 14 January, 
interim governments launched a number of improvised efforts to deal with the 
past. These efforts included investigative commissions, compensation, vetting 
of former regime officials, and criminal trials. However, it was only after the 
election of the National Constituent Assembly in October 2011 that there was 
a concerted effort to draft a comprehensive law on transitional justice. Tuni-
sia’s Ministry of Human Rights and Transitional Justice launched a national 
consultation to define and shape transitional justice mechanisms for post-Ben 
Ali Tunisia. This article argues that although Tunisia’s national consultation 
on transitional justice can be heralded as a novel consultative initiative to 
transmit transitional justice demands into transitional justice legislation, it has 
also served to highlight contested visions of the post-Ben Ali state and con-
tested memories of Tunisia’s secularist and Islamist political traditions.
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Introduction
On 14 January 2011, Tunisia’s President Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali fled into exi-
le in the face of popular protests that ended a regime which had ruled Tunisia 
since 7 November 1987. Tunisia’s Jasmine revolution, as the national wave of pro-
tests sparked by the suicide of a 26-year-old street vendor Mohammed Bouazizi 
in the southern city of Sidi Bouzid was globally popularized, constituted the first 
of the 2011 Arab Spring revolutions. Despite the public euphoria that greeted re-
gime change in Tunisia, Ben Ali’s ouster left Tunisia’s interim authorities confront-
ed with the complex task of establishing a new post-Ben Ali constitutional order 
in a deeply polarized domestic political setting while concurrently negotiating a 
package of transitional justice measures aimed at dealing with the 23-year legacy 
of a myriad of human rights abuses and financial crimes that were defining fea-
tures of Ben Ali’s autocratic rule. Although some observers expressed optimism 
as to the prospects for reconciling Tunisia’s divergent political traditions and de-
mocratic consolidation (Feuer, 2012), it quickly became apparent that a deepening 
polarization between two dominant political traditions, Islamists and secularists, 
risked accelerating Tunisia’s slide into political paralysis (Dhaouadi, 2012; Sadiki, 
2012).1
It is within the context of deepening domestic political polarization that Tuni-
sia has undertaken a national consultation on transitional justice in order to set out 
a comprehensive transitional justice strategy for the post-Ben Ali state. Ironically, 
transitional justice debates in Tunisia were initiated by Ben Ali himself to quell 
growing public unrest through concessionary measures announced in his last of-
ficial address to the nation on 13 January 2011, which included proposals to estab-
lish commissions to examine rights abuses, corruption and political reform.2 The 
three commissions were eventually established under Ben Ali’s successor Moha-
med Ghannouchi’s short-lived interim authority. After National Constituent Assem-
bly elections, held on 23 October 2011, brought into government a three-party coa-
lition led by Ennahdha, an Islamist movement that had borne the brunt of Ben Ali’s 
1 Chomiak referred to this political divide as the Ennahdha, anti-Ennahdha schism, which was 
framed as a dichotomy between Islamism and modernisation (2011: 81), while Jouini described 
this bipolarisation of post-Ben Ali Tunisian politics as constituting an ‘Islamist/Destourian’ di-
vide (2012: 10-11). Destourian is a reference to the political party led by Tunisia’s secularist 
President Habib Bourguiba. Destourian ideology, which emphasised ‘reason, human dignity, and 
human solidarity’, was argued by Vandewalle to have functioned as a principle means for ‘politi-
cal and social cohesion’ in post-independence Tunisia (1980: 150).
2 Ben Ali’s last address to the nation was broadcast on Tunisian national television on 13 Janu-
ary 2011. In response to the demands of the protesters, Ben Ali repeatedly stated ‘I understand 
you’.
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repressive police state,3 transitional justice has assumed greater political salience as 
it is perceived as not only a backwards-looking process aimed at dealing with the 
legacy of past abuses but also is likely to determine the trajectory of Tunisia’s tran-
sition as it has set the terms for criminal prosecutions, excluding individuals from 
voting or holding public office, dismissing public officials and through a proposed 
truth and reconciliation commission has the potential to recast the narrative of mod-
ern Tunisian history with far-reaching consequences for political parties which em-
brace Tunisia’s constitutional secularist, or Destourian, tradition set out by Tunisia’s 
first post-independence president Habib Bourguiba.4 
Given the political salience of transitional justice debates, it is not surprising 
that in 2012 Tunisia established a Ministry of Human Rights and Transitional Jus-
tice, which was created to coordinate and guide the transitional justice consulta-
tion process.5 Tunisia’s national consultation produced a draft transitional justice 
law which was presented to the Ministry on 28 October 2012. Although Tunisia’s 
transitional justice process remains at a very early stage, this article will reflect on 
transitional justice policies leading up to the presentation of the proposed draft law 
on transitional justice. It will thus focus on transitional justice during two post-
transition phases. The first phase covers two pre-election interim authorities which 
governed from 14 January 2011 to 23 October 2011, while the second covers the 
period from the date of Tunisia’s first democratic multiparty elections, 23 October 
2011, to 28 October 2012 when the transitional justice draft law was presented to 
the Ministry of Human Rights and Transitional Justice.
In addition to introducing the reader to Tunisia’s transitional justice process, 
this article will argue that transitional justice debates in Tunisia are just as much 
about shaping the post-Ben Ali state as they are about addressing past wrongs. It thus 
highlights the potential instrumentality of transitional justice, as local elites advance 
transitional justice mechanisms that serve to solidify their own hold on power while 
discrediting political opponents.6 Indeed, in Tunisia transitional justice has become 
a politically salient issue because of its potential to rewrite historical narratives that 
define how Tunisia’s opposing political traditions, Islamists under the banner of En-
3 The three-party coalition government, known as the troika, includes Ennahdha, Congress for 
the Republic (CPR), and Ettakatol.
4 For more on narratives, memory and transitional justice see Lanegran, 2005; Laplante, 2007; 
Rowen, 2013.
5 The Ministry of Human Rights and Transitional Justice guided the process in cooperation with 
the International Center for Transitional Justice, the United Nations Development Program and 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights.
6 For more on the instrumentalization of transitional justice by domestic elites see Subotic, 
2009.
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nahdha, and secularists under Nida Tounes imagine the post-Ben Ali state.7 However, 
before turning to these observations, it is first important to revisit Ben Ali’s Tunisia.
Tunisia under Ben Ali
Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali assumed Tunisia’s presidency on 7 November 1987 through 
a non-violent coup in which he deposed President Habib Bourguiba, who had ruled 
since independence in 1956.8 Bourguiba established Tunisia as a modernist secular 
state and deeply embedded Destourian ideology within the state institutions. Bour-
guiba’s secularism was particularly reflected in his promotion of public education 
and the adoption of the Personal Status Code.9 As Waltz observed, in Bourguiba’s 
Tunisia ‘... Islam has been made subservient to a secular state and its role in society 
has been progressively circumscribed’ (1986: 660). Bourguiba’s authoritarian se-
cularism was imposed with the aim of modernizing Tunisian society (Vandewalle, 
1980: 149-159; Vandewalle, 1988: 603-604); however, Bourguiba’s autocratic go-
vernance generated significant resistance from a wide range of societal actors ran-
ging from rivals within his own party to the far left (Allani, 2009: 259).
Beginning in the 1970s, Tunisia’s increasingly assertive Islamist movements 
attracted the attention of Tunisia’s repressive security services. The subsequent con-
testation between Islamist regime opponents and the state, under Bourguiba and 
later Ben Ali, would become a focal point for an emergent political cleavage that 
gravitated around the question of Islam and politics. Indeed, in 2009 Allani ob-
served that, ‘one of the most important issues in Tunisia over the last four decades 
– perhaps the single most important issue – has been the proper relationship of Is-
lam and politics’ (2009: 257). Allani’s words, while a description of Tunisia under 
Bourguiba and Ben Ali, are perhaps even more instructive when taken in the context 
7 Nida Tounes or ‘call for Tunisia’ is a political party established by Béji Caïd Essebsi in April 
2012 that has sought to bring together opposition parties to challenge Ennahdha, which is led 
by long-time opposition leader Rachid Ghannouchi. It is instructive to note that the leaders of 
Tunisia’s two largest political movements are in themselves historical figures within Tunisia’s 
modern history. The 71-year-old Ghannouchi spent over a decade in exile in London, while Es-
sebsi, who is 86 years old, was a minister under Tunisia’s first post-independence president, Ha-
bib Bourguiba. Transitional justice’s narrative-writing function has been observed in the former 
Yugoslavia where states sought to advance their own narratives of transition and conflict. See 
Lamont, 2010; Subotic, 2009; and Pavlakovic, 2010.
8 Ben Ali deposed Bourguiba in a bloodless coup in which Bourguiba was declared unfit for of-
fice due to health problems (Chelly, 2012: 42-43).
9 Béji Caïd Essebsi emphasized Bourguiba’s commitment to promoting women’s emancipation 
through the Personal Status Code as constituting an important part of his modernisation pro-
gramme (2009: 62-63). For more on Bourguiba’s promotion of education see Vandewalle, 1980: 
149-159.
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of an on-going contestation over the relationship between Islam and the state in Tu-
nisia’s post-revolutionary constitutional debates.10
Ben Ali, Bourguiba’s former minister of interior and briefly prime minister, 
rose through the security services keeping watch over domestic regime opponents. 
The key among these opposition movements was the Islamic Tendency Movement, 
a precursor to Ennahdha (Alexander, 1997: 37). Yet despite having emerged from 
Bourguiba’s repressive security apparatus, Ben Ali initially moved to liberalise Tu-
nisian politics upon becoming president (Sadiki, 2002: 132). Indeed, Ben Ali am-
nestied thousands of political prisoners, abolished presidencies for life, ratified the 
United Nations convention against torture, and even entered into a dialogue with 
Ennahdha (Alexander, 1997: 35; Sadiki, 2002: 132-133). Ben Ali also created a new 
ruling party, the Rassemblement Constitutionnel Democratique (RCD), or Constitu-
tional Democratic Rally. However, unlike Bourguiba who cultivated multiple clien-
telistic power bases, within the RCD Ben Ali firmly established himself as the sole 
centre of gravity (Alexander, 1997: 36-37).
Despite the initial optimism that surrounded Tunisia’s regime transition in 
1987, beginning in 1988, Ben Ali reversed course and turned increasingly autocra-
tic. In 1997 Alexander accurately captured this abrupt reversal in trajectory:
Ben Ali’s November 7, 1987 coup inaugurated the heady period of political re-
form that swept across the Middle East and North Africa in the late 1980s. The 
new president promised to establish the rule of law, to respect human rights, and 
to implement the kind of democratic political reforms that Habib Bourguiba had 
steadfastly refused. Along with Algeria, Jordan and Yemen, Tunisia rode the lead-
ing edge of what many hoped would be a wave of democratic transitions in the 
region. Ten years later, it would be difficult to find another country that has moved 
so far in the opposite direction (Alexander, 1997: 34).
This reversal can be explained in the context of Ennahdha’s increasing assert-
iveness during the late 1980s. To be sure, Ben Ali’s temporary rapprochement with 
the Islamists had been entirely strategic. Sadiki pointed out, ‘[Ben] Ali was a gene-
ral. Tactically, it would not have made good political sense to open up a second 
front against the Islamists when he was busy purging the country of Bourguiba’s 
powerful lackeys who opposed the November 1987 bloodless coup’ (2002: 132). 
Therefore, while the Islamists, who were repressed under Bourguiba, perceived the 
political opening that emerged with Ben Ali’s coup in 1987 as an opportunity to 
pursue political power through the ballot box, after consolidating power Ben Ali 
moved against the Islamist opposition. Ben Ali banned Ennahdha and cracked down 
10 At the time of writing Tunisia is continuing the process of constitution-drafting. Significantly, 
the most divisive draft articles relate to the relationship between the state and religion.
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on its members and supporters. Tens of thousands of its members in Tunisia were 
imprisoned including future Ennahdha ministers Hamadi Jebali, who would spend 
15 years in prison, Ali Larayedh, who also spent more than a decade in prison, and 
Samir Dilou, who would serve 10 years in prison. Ennahdha’s leader Rachid Ghan-
nouchi went into exile in London, after having also been imprisoned.
By the late 2000s Tunisia was included in some counts as being among the 
world’s most repressive states.11 The regime routinely carried out a catalogue of 
human rights abuses that ranged from intrusive surveillance to torture and extra-
judicial killings (Henry, 2007: 300-324). In particular, those expressing dissenting 
views found themselves subjected to state surveillance and other forms of abuse 
(Amnesty International, 2010). In addition to violations of civil and political rights, 
the regime was also engaged in corruption on a massive scale that invoked compari-
sons to Haiti’s Papa Doc Duvalier and Indonesia’s Suharto (Sadiki, 2010). In fact, 
it was estimated Tunisia lost over a billion US dollars annually to corruption (Al-
Amin, 2012: 45-46). Given rampant corruption, growing youth unemployment and 
systemic abuses of civil and political rights, the 28-day wave of national protests 
that dislodged Ben Ali from office drew upon a wide range of grievances that would 
in turn be reflected in transitional justice discourses in the immediate aftermath of 
the Jasmine revolution. 
Interim Justice: Emergent Discourses
As previously noted, Tunisia’s transitional justice process was born in the crucible 
of violent repression and regime collapse. At this point, it is important to emphasize 
that Tunisia did not experience a state of armed conflict, as observed in Libya and 
Syria, which produced hundreds of thousands of conflict-related victims at the point 
of regime transition and reinforced identity lines in divided societies, but rather Tu-
nisia was faced with confronting the legacy of long-term repression that spanned 
decades and included both civil and economic abuses. Furthermore, Tunisia can be 
said to have experienced two transitions during 2011. The first marked the depar-
ture of President Ben Ali on 14 January and was followed by an attempt by the RCD 
elite to quickly cobble together an interim authority to hand over the presidency to 
Mohamed Ghannouchi, a senior figure within Ben Ali’s RCD who served as prime 
minister from 1999 until 2011.12 Although Ghannouchi resigned his position within 
11 Tunisia was included alongside North Korea, Zimbabwe and Uzbekistan, among others in a 
2007 edited volume entitled The Worst of the Worst: Dealing with Repressive and Rogue Nations 
(Rotberg, 2007). Furthermore, in the final year of Ben Ali’s rule, Freedom House ranked Tunisia 
at 7, the lowest possible ranking, in relation to political rights (Freedom House, 2010).
12 Prior to becoming prime minister in 1999, Mohamed Ghannouchi had served various ministe-
rial functions in Ben Ali’s cabinets since 1989.
Politička misao, Vol. 49, No. 5, 2012, pp. 32-49
38
the RCD on 18 January and established a national unity government with represen-
tatives from opposition parties and civil society, Ghannouchi was perceived as too 
closely associated with the old regime to be able to advance any meaningful transi-
tion and thus protesters once again took to the streets and began massing outside the 
prime minister’s office in Tunis to demand a more explicit break from the past. The 
second transition took place on 27 February, following a second wave of public pro-
tests and sit-ins that became known as Kasbah Two.13 On 27 February Ghannouchi 
resigned as interim prime minister and another prominent political figure, less tied 
to the Ben Ali regime, Béji Caïd Essebsi would guide Tunisia’s interim government 
until National Constituent Assembly elections were held on 23 October 2011.
During the period that preceded National Constituent Assembly elections, Tu-
nisia pursued interim justice measures aimed at tackling the most pressing transi-
tional justice dilemmas. While, comparatively, the Tunisian revolution did not reach 
levels of violence seen in neighbouring states, Ben Ali’s attempt to violently supress 
public protests resulted in over 300 deaths and 2000 injuries.14 To be sure, during 
the 28 days that followed Bouazizi’s act of self-immolation and leading up to Ben 
Ali’s departure into exile in Saudi Arabia, Tunisian security forces violently sup-
pressed public protests in a nationwide campaign of repression from Kassrine in the 
hinterland to the streets of Tunis.
Therefore, in the immediate aftermath of transition one of the first transitional 
justice demands was for accountability for the acts of violence perpetrated against 
protesters from 17 December 2010, the date of Bouazizi’s self-immolation, until 14 
January. Because Ben Ali had fled the country along with his wife, Leila Trabel-
si, neither could be held directly accountable for past crimes, except symbolically 
through in absentia trials. Other pressing demands addressed during this period in-
cluded the initiation of attempts to recover financial assets held by the Ben Ali fa-
mily and political reforms aimed at launching a constitution-drafting process. In or-
der to collectively address these demands, the three commissions proposed by Ben 
Ali in the final days of his regime were hastily established. In sum, the first phase of 
transition was characterized by ad hoc responses to a rapid and unexpected regime 
collapse, and thus transitional justice policies enacted during this phase lacked co-
13 Kasbah One is a reference to the protests that took place on 23-28 January 2011 which de-
manded that former RCD ministers should not participate in the transition government. Kasbah 
Two, the protests which resulted in Ghannouchi’s resignation, began on 25 February.
14 The casualty figure of 300 is commonly cited and was reported by United Nations Special 
Rapporteur on Torture, Juan Mendez, following a fact-finding visit to Tunisia in May 2011 (Haj-
jar, 2011). This figure was confirmed by Tunisia’s fact-finding commission into human rights 
abuses during the revolution which established that 338 deaths and 2147 injuries were inflicted 
during the revolution (La Presse, 2012).
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herence. Instead, they reflect improvised responses to a wide array of societal and 
political actors advancing competing transitional justice demands. 
Interim Justice: Commissions, Courts and Compensation 
In January 2011 President Ben Ali pledged in a televised address to the nation to hold 
individuals responsible for acts of violence against protesters accountable and to cre-
ate three commissions to quell public protest: a commission for the investigation of 
corruption, a commission for the investigation of human rights abuses and a commis-
sion for political reform (Ferchichi, 2011: 251). While Ben Ali’s concessions were 
offered as a late attempt to appease public outrage, they also marked the beginning 
of the transitional justice debate in the soon to be post-Ben Ali Tunisia.15 
It was under the interim authority of Mohamed Ghannouchi that the three com-
missions proposed by Ben Ali were established.16 The interim authorities issued 
three decrees on 18 February 2011 formally establishing three commissions, the 
National Commission for the Investigation of Bribery and Corruption, the National 
Commission for the Investigation of the Facts of Abuses Recorded during the Pe-
riod from 17 December 2010, and the High Commission for the Fulfilment of the 
Revolutionary Goals, Political Reform and Democratic Transition. While the first 
two commissions were tasked with uncovering past abuses, the Political Reform 
Commission under Yadh Ben Achour effectively guided Tunisia until the 23 Octo-
ber elections.17
In addition to the three commissions, two of which were explicitly tasked with 
exposing past abuses, criminal prosecutions were also initiated against former re-
gime elites alleged to be responsible for acts of violence against protesters from 
17 December 2010 until 14 January 2011. These proceedings eventually resulted 
in the convictions of the former president alongside other senior security service 
15 Ben Ali initially promised to create investigative commissions on 10 January and repeated 
this promise on 13 January 2011.
16 The National Commission for the Investigation of Bribery and Corruption was formally es-
tablished through a decree issued by the interim government, Decree No. 7, 18 February 2011. 
However, the Commission started its work two weeks prior to its official establishment under Tu-
nisian law. Decree No. 8 established the National Commission for the Investigation of the Facts 
of Abuses Recorded during the Period from 17 December 2010. Decree No. 9 established the 
High Commission for the Fulfilment of the Revolutionary Goals, Political Reform and Demo-
cratic Transition to guide the transitional process. An additional commission, the Commission 
for the Reform of Media and Communication, was established on 2 March 2011. 
17 For clarity, we will refer to the High Commission for the Fulfilment of the Revolutionary 
Goals, Political Reform and Democratic Transition as, simply, the Political Reform Commis-
sion. This Commission was also often referred to as the Ben Achour Commission, and it ceased 
operation on 11 October 2011.
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figures which included a former minister of interior and senior officers within the 
Riot Police. The most prominent of these trials was held in June 2012 before the Le 
Kef Military Tribunal which sentenced Ben Ali to life in prison for the killings of 
protesters during the revolution in an in absentia trial.18 In an earlier separate trial 
held in 2011 Ben Ali and his wife, Leila Trabelsi, were convicted for embezzlement 
of public funds resulting in 35-year prison sentences (Kirkpatrick, 2011).19 Never-
theless, a continuing obstacle to accountability through criminal trials during this 
period was the absence of substantive reform of the judiciary, which complicated 
prosecutorial efforts.
In addition to criminal trials of perpetrators, financial compensation was pro-
vided to persons injured during the violent events between 17 December and 14 
January 2011 and also to the families of individuals killed by Tunisian security ser-
vices. These payments were distributed in two instalments, the first in February 
2011 and the second in December 2011. However, Human Rights Watch noted that 
there were no clear criteria for determining whether or not an individual had been 
injured by the state while participating in the revolution or criteria that would es-
tablish the level of financial compensation of each victim (Human Rights Watch, 
2012c). In sum, during the months following 14 January, transitional justice was ad-
vanced on a number of fronts ranging from investigative commissions and criminal 
trials to financial compensation; however, it would be the question of imposing a 
prohibition upon former regime officials and sympathisers from holding elected of-
fice that would set off a debate that would only temporarily be resolved through Tu-
nisia’s draft electoral law which established the legislative framework for National 
Constituent Assembly elections in October 2011.
Interim Justice: Identifying the Excluded
The question of whether regime officials affiliated with the RCD should be permit-
ted to participate in shaping Tunisia’s post-Ben Ali political order has become per-
18 Other senior officials also convicted and sentenced in the Kef Military Tribunal’s proceedings 
included a 12-year sentence for former interior minister Rafiq Haj Kacem, 10-year sentences for 
Adel Tiouiri, former director general of National Security, and Jalel Boudrigua, former director 
of the Anti-Riot Police, Lotfi Ben Zouaoui, former director general of Public Security, Youssef 
Ben Abdelaziz, former brigadier general in the Anti-Riot Police, and Khaled Ben Said, former 
director of Special Anti-Terrorist Brigades (Human Rights Watch, 2012b).
19 Overall, the legal framework for holding individuals accountable for systemic crimes, such 
as torture, remains inadequate as noted by a recent Human Rights Watch report on Tunisia’s first 
post-revolution criminal prosecution related to the crime of torture. Former Minister of Interior 
Abdallah Kallel was prosecuted for the crime of torture along with three other security officials 
in relation to Kallel’s involvement in foiling an alleged plot of military officers against the re-
gime (Human Rights Watch, 2012a). 
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haps the most divisive issue in post-revolution Tunisia. The Political Reform Com-
mission was tasked with establishing the criteria for excluding individuals from 
participating in National Constituent Assembly elections and proposed Article 15 
of the Tunisian Electoral Law to establish and identify individuals who would be 
prohibited from standing in Tunisia’s first democratic multi-party elections. Article 
15 established three categories of excluded persons: individuals who held ministe-
rial office under Ben Ali, individuals with senior positions of responsibility within 
the RCD, and individuals who publicly called for Ben Ali to seek an additional term 
in office in August 2010. In relation to the first two categories of excluded persons, 
it was left to Tunisia’s election oversight body, L’Instance Supérieure Indépendante 
pour les Élections (ISIE), an independent electoral commission established by the 
Political Reform Commission, to produce a list of excluded individuals. In relation 
to the third category, those who called for Ben Ali’s re-election as president, known 
as munachidine or ‘those who implored’ in Tunisian Arabic, the High Commission 
on Political Reform itself was to produce a list of excluded individuals. The High 
Commission based its list on a published August 2010 petition that called for Ben 
Ali to seek an additional term as president in 2014; however, the Commission failed 
to notify individuals whose name appeared on this list or establish a process through 
which an individual could challenge their exclusion. The latter was of particular 
concern because some individuals were able to successfully challenge their exclu-
sion through demonstrating that their names were added to the August 2010 petition 
without their knowledge (Carter Center, 2011: 18).
Interim Justice: Defining the Past
In sum, transitional justice from 14 January until 23 October 2011 proved limited 
because of its narrow temporal focus on acts of repression during the 28-day revo-
lution or its ad hoc attempts to engage with systemic abuses of the ancien régime. 
Furthermore, a more fundamental question regarding temporality remained to be 
addressed. Should transitional justice measures focus on the abuses of the previous 
regime, that of Ben Ali, or should they also encompass Habib Bourguiba’s regime 
which would potentially expose abuses going back to Tunisia’s independence and 
founding as a secularist state? Significantly, it is not surprising that secularists ex-
press a preference for a narrower temporal scope for transitional justice measures 
that would focus on the Ben Ali regime while Ennahdha, which includes within its 
ranks numerous victims of rights abuses spanning across both the Bourguiba and 
Ben Ali presidencies, strongly advocates a broader temporal mandate that would 
go back to Tunisia’s independence and thus present an opportunity to challenge the 
modernist founding myth of the Tunisian state. 
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Contested Narratives: The State of Transitional Justice
On 23 October 2011, Tunisia held its first democratic multi-party elections since 
independence. These elections resulted in Ennahdha’s electoral triumph as voters 
propelled Tunisia’s Islamist opposition into government with post-election coali-
tion partners the Congress for the Republic (CPR) and Ettakatol. Under Ennahdha’s 
three-party coalition government, commonly referred to as the Troika, Ennahdha 
set out first to promulgate an interim constitution to provide a framework for go-
vernance, then to carry out a constitution-drafting process. Once an interim consti-
tution, the Law on the Interim Organisation of Public Powers of Tunisia, known in 
Tunisia as the ‘little constitution’, was adopted on 10 December 2011, the National 
Constituent Assembly elected an interim president, Moncef Marzouki, a long-time 
human rights advocate from the CPR, on 12 December. Marzouki in turn appointed 
Hamadi Jebali from Ennahdha to form a government, which was presented to the 
NCA on 24 December.
It was within this context that Ennahdha also sought to adopt a coherent tran-
sitional justice programme. Programmatically, Ennahdha embraced transitional jus-
tice as a means to symbolically break with the past. The Ennahdha party programme 
noted, ‘The Ennahdha movement proposes to Tunisians to establish a political sys-
tem that eradicates the roots of dictatorship’ (Ennahdha, 2011). Furthermore, Chap-
ter 4, Article 24 of the ‘little constitution’ expressly tasked the NCA with enacting 
a law on transitional justice within its mandate (Law on the Interim Organisation 
of Public Powers, 2011) and the Ministry of Human Rights and Transitional Justice 
was established on 19 January 2012. Ennahdha’s Minister of Human Rights and 
Transitional Justice, Samir Dilou, enthusiastically embraced transitional justice and 
firmly embedded his new ministry at the core of transitional justice policy-making 
and debates.20 However, Dilou claimed that the Ministry’s role was not to impose 
Ennahdha’s vision of transitional justice, but rather he suggested, ‘the role of the 
ministry will mainly comprise of coordinating and facilitating communication be-
tween the different stakeholders’ (Ghribi, 2012). Nevertheless, Dilou used his plat-
form as Minister of Human Rights and Transitional Justice to make explicit his op-
position to ex-RCD members returning to government, in a veiled reference to the 
emergent opposition bloc Nida Tounes.21
20 Samir Dilou is a human rights lawyer who was initially detained for his participation in the 
1984 bread riots and later spent a decade in prison under the Ben Ali regime (Lachheb, 2011).
21 The question of political exclusion remains open as Tunisia prepares for its first post-NCA 
elections. The CPR, a member of the governing coalition, submitted a draft law on political ex-
clusion in April 2012 which would ban former RCD officials from joining other political parties 
for a period of five years. This law would have the effect of excluding thousands from the po-
litical process. In November 2012, Ennahdha proposed its own legislation entitled, ‘law on the 
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In sharp contrast to the ad hoc attempts to address the legacies of past abuses 
undertaken by Mohamed Ghannouchi and Béji Caïd Essebsi’s pre-NCA interim au-
thorities, the Ministry of Human Rights and Transitional Justice sponsored an of-
ficial launch of the transitional justice process in Tunisia in order to set the agenda 
for transitional justice debates under the NCA. In coordination with international 
actors, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the International Center 
for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) and the United Nations Office of the High Commis-
sioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the Ministry organised a national seminar to 
launch a national consultation on transitional justice on 14 April 2012 in Tunis that 
aimed to bring together relevant institutional stakeholders in the transitional justice 
process: domestic and international non-governmental organisations, international 
organisations, and domestic and international political officials. Illustrative of the 
extent to which Tunisia’s transitional elites sought to promote transitional justice 
was the fact that Tunisia’s three presidencies, as the President of the Republic Mon-
cef Marzouki, the President of the National Constituent Assembly Mostafa Ben 
Jafaar and the Prime Minister Hamadi Jebali are known domestically, attended the 
event along with other governmental ministers.
In addition to bringing together domestic elites, the transitional justice launch 
event also attracted a number of international representatives including internatio-
nal organisations that worked closely with the Ministry of Human Rights and Tran-
sitional Justice in formulating Tunisia’s transitional justice policies, such as a re-
presentative from the OHCHR, a resident representative of the UNDP in Tunisia, 
the President of the International Center for Transitional Justice. Others in attend-
ance also included the President of the National Council for Human Rights in Mo-
rocco in addition to a number of ambassadors, national figures and representatives 
of political parties, associations and organisations.22 
Two weeks following the transitional justice launch event on 14 April, a tran-
sitional justice open day was hosted by the Ministry of Human Rights and Transi-
tional Justice on 28 April. Relevant non-governmental organisations, identified by 
the Ministry, were invited to attend this event. These activities were aimed at ini-
tiating a consultation process that would underpin the process of drafting a law of 
transitional justice. During this period, a number of civil society actors expressed 
optimism as to the Ministry’s engagement with domestic non-governmental organi-
sations.23
protection of the revolution’ which would also exclude former RCD members from standing in 
elections, but also exclude them from a number of civil service positions, for a period of 10 years 
(Babnet Tunisie, 2012).
22 This event was attended by one of the authors.
23 Fieldwork interview, June 2012.
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Consultative Justice and the Transitional Justice Commissions
Transitional justice debates in Tunisia relate to two broad categories of perpetrators 
and victims. Those involved in historic abuses dating back to the founding of the 
Tunisian state in 1956 and those involved in the more immediate abuses perpetrated 
over the course of December 2010 and January 2011. In relation to each, demands 
for various transitional justice mechanisms have been advanced: criminal trials, truth 
commissions, reparations, and administrative purges. In an attempt to bundle these 
divergent and at times competing demands into coherent policies, Dilou established a 
technical commission to oversee a national dialogue on transitional justice, as the na-
tional consultation was known, through a ministerial decree issued on 28 May 2012.
In order to allay concerns that the Ennahdha-led coalition government, or the 
Troika, was agenda-setting transitional justice debates, the technical commission 
was established as an independent body outside the Ministry that would consist of 
both ministerial and civil society representatives and would be tasked with writing 
the draft law on transitional justice after a national consultation had been carried out 
through six regional consultative commissions.24 The regional commissions were to 
engage in direct consultations with relevant stakeholders and victims, and were to 
be supervised by the technical commission.
Meanwhile, the technical commission’s responsibilities were set out by the Minis-
try of Human Rights and Transitional Justice on 9 October 2012. The commission’s 
duties included: the organization of the national dialogue on transitional justice; 
organizing public consultations; selecting members of sectorial committees, col-
lecting the results of the national dialogue, drafting a final report, and preparing the 
draft law on transitional justice (Government of the Republic of Tunisia, 2012). In 
the end, despite continuing concerns that the Ministry of Human Rights and Transi-
tional Justice has not been as inclusive as it could have been in its engagement with 
civil society,25 the technical commission engaged with over 20 non-governmental 
organisations while preparing its draft law.
In relation to consultations, these were carried out by the six regional com-
missions from 16 September until 7 October 2012. Each regional commission was 
responsible for four governorates. Common methods used by these commissions 
to establish victim preferences included surveys and questionnaires. For example, 
survey data collected by the commissions, and made available to the authors, indi-
24 Civil society representation in the technical commission included the Tunisian Centre for 
Transitional Justice; the Independent National Coordination of Transitional Justice; the Centre 
for Human Rights and Transitional Justice; the Centre for Democratic Transition and Transition-
al Justice (Kawakibi); the Tunisian Network for Transitional Justice.
25 Fieldwork interview, October 2012.
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cated that 1825 respondents drawn from 2600 participants expressed diverse views 
on expectations from transitional justice. Indeed, one finding of interest was that of 
the 1825 surveyed, 37 percent stated that they sought recognition or acknowledge-
ment of their suffering through transitional justice, while 29 percent sought mone-
tary compensation, and 28 percent sought admission on the part of the perpetrator.26 
Furthermore, regional consultation participants also frequently voiced concerns re-
lated to past economic wrongs and the need to address socio-economic rights within 
the context of transitional justice.27
Transitional Justice after Consultation
While the transitional justice law proposed by the technical commission contains 75 
articles and at the time of writing remains in draft form (Draft Law on Transitional 
Justice, 2012), one important feature of this law is that it would create a successor 
coordinating body for transitional justice in Tunisia. This body would be known 
as the Commission of Truth and Dignity and it would be charged with overseeing 
transitional justice (Samti, 2012).28 However, as noted earlier, political exclusion 
debates continue to overshadow transitional justice discourses as attempts to nego-
tiate the extent to which former RCD members and sympathisers would be purged 
from post-Ben Ali politics remain highly contested. Ennahdha’s November 2012 
draft law on political exclusion, entitled the Law on the Protection of the Revolu-
tion posits a more draconian exclusion regime than that which was put in place for 
the October 2011 NCA elections and that which was proposed by Ennahdha’s coali-
tion partner, CPR, in April 2012. Ennahdha’s draft law would target those who were 
members of the RCD from 2 April 1989 until 14 January 2011, along with those 
who called for Ben Ali’s re-election in 2014. These individuals would be prohibited 
from contesting elected office at both the national and local levels and prohibited 
from civil service positions for a period of 10 years (Law on the Protection of the 
Revolution, 2012). While Ennahdha argued this draft law did not target Essebsi’s 
Nida Tounes, Essebsi rejected this claim and argued that the effect of this law would 
be to empty the ranks of the opposition (Al Chourouk, 2012).
Conclusions
Transitional justice in Tunisia, while initially characterized by a number of ad hoc 
attempts to address the legacy of a wide array of past abuses ranging from civil and 
political rights abuses to acts of corruption, became embedded in a national consul-
26 Survey results on file with author.
27 These discussions were observed by one of the authors of this article.
28 It should also be noted that opposition parties, such as al Jouhmouri, have also proposed their 
own draft laws on transitional justice.
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tation that sought to translate transitional justice demands into legislation. Tunisia’s 
Ministry of Human Rights and Transitional Justice established itself as the principle 
coordinating body for transitional justice debates in Tunisia following NCA elec-
tions in October 2011 and launched a national consultation on transitional justice 
through its technical commission and six regional consultative commissions. Ne-
vertheless, while Tunisia’s national consultation resulted in a draft law on transi-
tional justice that was presented to the Ministry and the NCA government in Oc-
tober 2012, transitional justice debates in Tunisia remain politically discordant as 
Tunisian elites seek to negotiate a new post-Ben Ali constitutional order. It is within 
this context that the temporal boundaries of transitional justice have expanded since 
the revolution. The first investigative commission to examine human rights abuses 
was mandated only to investigate abuses that took place after 17 December 2010. 
Today, many Tunisians, in particular Ennahdha, express a preference for transition-
al justice mechanisms to explore abuses dating back to the founding of the modern 
Tunisian state in 1956. These debates over the temporal boundaries of transitional 
justice reflect divergent perspectives on Tunisia’s modern history and the secular 
state. As an opposition movement which had borne the brunt of state repression, it 
is not surprising that Ennahdha’s leadership – many of whom were victims of long-
term detention and torture – has embraced transitional justice as a means of decon-
structing the modernist narratives of Bourguiba and Ben Ali. In Tunisia transitional 
justice has become perhaps one of the most divisive questions that emerged from 
the January 2011 revolution with on-going contestations over the temporal man-
dates of investigative bodies, criminal prosecutions, dismissals and the limits of po-
litical exclusion. Although how each of these questions will be addressed remains 
open at the time of writing, the negotiation of transitional justice during transition 
in Tunisia imparts how transitional justice mechanisms at once deal with the legacy 
of past abuses and shape the trajectory of transition.
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